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Hedge funds' best ideas #95 - Q1'26 Pitches

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May 13, 2026 · 15:22

<div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading Stock Analysis Compilation! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input class="email-input" name="email" tabindex="-1" type="email" /><input class="button primary" type="submit" value="Subscribe" /><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Upgrade Your Edge on HFBestIdeas.com</strong> &#128640;</h3><p>Stop spending hours sourcing and digesting Hedge Fund letters. Let HFBestIdeas do the manual work for you and turn over more rocks in less time. </p><p><strong>Try any premium plan free for 7 days:</strong></p><ul><li><p><strong>The Analyst ($10/mo):</strong> Full newsletter (35+ stock pitches/week).</p></li><li><p><strong>The Associate ($19/mo):</strong> Full access to our pitch database + Quarterly Letter archive.</p></li><li><p><strong>The Rainmaker ($29/mo):</strong> Total access + <strong>Warren AI</strong>, your proprietary research assistant.</p></li></ul><p><em>Note: For Associate &amp; Rainmaker access, please subscribe directly at <a href="https://HFBestIdeas.com">HFBestIdeas.com</a>.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/pricing"><span>Start Your 7-Day Free Trial</span></a></p><p>Now, let&#8217;s get into this week&#8217;s selection of fund ideas &#128071;</p><div><hr /></div><h3>Summary :</h3><p>&#128313; AmpliTech Group (AMPG US) by Deep Sail Capital</p><p>&#128313; AppLovin Corporation (APP US) by Bristlemoon Capital</p><p>&#128313; Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (300750 CH) by Munro Climate Change Leaders Fund</p><p>&#128313; CTS Eventim AG &amp; Co. KGaA (EVD GY) by Acatis</p><p>&#128313; Edwards Lifesciences Corp (EW US) by Artisan Global Opportunities Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Eurobank SA (EUROB GA) by Ariel Global</p><p>&#128313; Hangzhou First Applied Material (603806 CH) by Guinness China A Share</p><p>&#128313; Harbor Diversified (HRBR US) by Cedar Creek Partners</p><p>&#128313; Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. (HE US) by Horizon Kinetics</p><p>&#128313; Hemnet Group AB (HEM SS) by Bristlemoon Capital</p><p>&#128313; Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (388 HK) by Longriver</p><p>&#128313; Infineon Technologies AG (IFX GY) by Ariel International Developed Markets</p><p>&#128313; Insmed Inc (INSM US) by Artisan Global Discovery Strategy</p><p>&#128313; KKR &amp; Co., Inc. (KKR US) by Akre Capital</p><p>&#128313; Luotea (LUOTEA FH) by Pontus</p><p>&#128313; Minimax Group Inc (100 HK) by Artisan Developing World Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Net Lease Office Properties (NLOP US) by Kingdom Capital Advisors</p><p>&#128313; Perma-Fix Environmental (PESI US) by White Brook Capital</p><p>&#128313; Ranger Energy Services, Inc. (RNGR US) by Riverwater Micro Opportunities</p><p>&#128313; RBC Bearings Inc (RBC US) by Artisan Global Discovery Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Roblox Corp (RBLX US) by Artisan Global Opportunities Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Rohm Co Ltd (6963 JP) by Artisan Non-U.S. Small-Mid Growth Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Roper Technologies, Inc. (ROP US) by Oakmark Equity and Income Fund</p><p>&#128313; Rotork plc (ROR LN) by Artisan Non-U.S. Small-Mid Growth Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Sanara Medtech (SMTI US) by White Brook Capital</p><p>&#128313; ServiceNow Inc (NOW US) by Nightview Capital</p><p>&#128313; SK Hynix Inc. (000660 KS) by Ariel Emerging Markets Value ex-China</p><p>&#128313; Smiths Group plc (SMIN LN) by Artisan Non-U.S. Small-Mid Growth Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Spotify Technology SA (SPOT US) by Artisan Global Discovery Strategy</p><p>&#128313; Stella-Jones (SJ CN) by Upslope Capital</p><p>&#128313; Unity Software (U US) by White Falcon Capital</p><p>&#128313; Visa Inc. (V US) by Appalaches Capital</p><p>&#128313; Wavestone (WAVE FP) by Acatis</p><p>&#128313; Weichai Power (000338 CH) by Guinness China A Share</p><p>&#128313; Yubico (YUBICO SS) by Pontus</p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>AmpliTech Group $AMPG US by Deep Sail Capital</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis:<br /><br /></strong>AmpliTech Group is a U.S.-based RF and 5G ORAN systems provider benefiting from ORAN adoption, sizable LOIs, improving margins, strong management execution, and attractive valuation upside.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rjAsMiIEmw8W7_IivMZe4mgqSvhjG9OM/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis:<br /><br /></strong>Current Position: AmpliTech &#8211; Emerging Growth<br /><br />AmpliTech Group (AMPG) operates a high-quality, diversified business model centered on designing, developing, and manufacturing advanced RF and microwave signal-processing components and systems. The company serves multiple end markets, which include satellite communications, 5G/6G telecom, quantum computing, defense, aerospace, and space. It operates through five divisions: AmpliTech Inc., Specialty Microwave, Spectrum Semiconductor Materials, AmpliTech Group Microwave Design Center, and the fast-growing AmpliTech Group 5G Division.<br /><br />AmpliTech&#8217;s 5G ORAN product is the material driver of the current revenue growth that the company has seen. ORAN (or O-RAN) stands for &#8220;Open Radio Access Network.&#8221; ORAN, led by the O-RAN Alliance, is an agreed-upon framework that has been adopted by telecom operators for 5G networks, mainly in non-US markets. 5G ORAN is an open interface for building a 5G network. This allows telecom operators to mix and match vendors, reducing their dependence on proprietary, single-vendor systems while improving the supply chain and driving down costs for the telecom operators.<br /><br />A key point about true 5G networks vs. 4G or 4G LTE is that due to the coverage efficiency, bandwidth used, and latency requirements, 5G networks will have materially more endpoints (RAN) devices required than 4G networks. This means that ORAN makers will be in high demand as the replacement cycle from 4G to 5G continues, which is a massive tailwind for AmpliTech for the next 3 years.<br /><br />The company is currently forecasting at least $50m in 2026 revenue (100% growth over 2025), which will be driven by two large LOI&#8217;s that they have secured. The company announced in 2025 they have received an LOI for $78 million in ORAN radio systems with an Asian telco and a $40m LOI for a North American MNO. These LOIs are both just getting ramped up and will support the 2026 revenue growth.<br /><br />High quality business model<br /><br />AmpliTech&#8217;s business segmentation structure creates natural cross-selling opportunities and a somewhat resilient revenue base, although their 5G ORAN business is lumpy. The legacy components business (low-noise amplifiers (LNAs) and low-noise blocks (LNBs)) provides stable, high-margin recurring demand from satellite, defense, and test/measurement customers. Their 5G systems business, which was materially scaled up in 2025, delivers a scalable, high-volume platform revenue opportunity within the 5G Open RAN (ORAN) space.<br /><br />Fiscal 2025 revenue reached a record $25.2 million, up approximately 165% year-over-year from $9.5 million in 2024. Growth was driven by strong demand for LNA/LNB products, expanded 5G product lines, and a rebound in the Spectrum division&#8217;s Asian markets. Gross profit rose to $6.0 million (from $3.5 million), but gross margin compressed to 23.9% (from 36.7%).<br /><br />This compression in gross margin was largely a one-off event tied to three factors: (1) elevated legal and professional fees associated with capital-raising activities and compliance during the year&#8217;s rapid scaling; (2) one-time costs from the registered direct and rights offerings that strengthened the balance sheet; and (3) the deliberate early-stage ramp-up of carrier-grade 5G ORAN radio production, including competitive pricing to secure Tier-1 operator relationships and initial manufacturing scale-up inefficiencies. Management has explicitly guided that these headwinds are transitory and gross margins should return to the ~40% range in the back half of 2026 and be trending toward the 30&#8211;50% telecom industry benchmark as fixed costs are absorbed and pricing normalizes on established contracts. This margin improvement should be steadily driven as the company shifts from market-penetration pricing and low-volume pilot deployments to recurring, high-volume orders with better gross margins.<br /><br />The model is further strengthened by vertical integration with design and manufacturing in the U.S., patented front-end and LNA technologies, and a transition from pure component supplier to full systems provider. AmpliTech&#8217;s products are 100% American-made, which may be a key selling point with US telcom providers due to onshoring efforts in the future.<br /><br />Outstanding management<br /><br />Amplitech is led by its founder, chairman, president, and CEO, Fawad Maqbool. Fawad has 30 years of microwave engineering experience with dual BSEE degrees in microwave and biomedical engineering. He has scaled the business from nothing to $50m in revenue forecasted for 2026. Maqbool founded the company in 2002 and has steered it from a bootstrapped startup to a NASDAQ-listed growth platform while maintaining hands-on oversight of RF innovation.<br /><br />Outside of Fawad, AmpliTech&#8217;s leadership team combines deep technical expertise with proven operational discipline. Complementing him is COO Jorge Flores, who joined in 2021 with over 30 years of operations and program management experience across complex manufacturing environments.<br /><br />Management&#8217;s execution has been strong within the last few years. In 2025 they delivered 165% revenue growth while simultaneously certifying the industry&#8217;s first U.S.-manufactured 64T64R CAT-B massive MIMO ORAN radio. This 5g ORAN product allowed them to secure the $78m LOI with a Tier-1 operator. While their 4Q results showed a gross margin decline due to the 5G ramp, they continue to be transparent and unwavering about the long-term vision for the company. As they approach a positive operating profit (likely later in 2026), they have proactively raised capital on favorable terms to fund the 5G ramp once the business inflects. Guidance has been consistently met or raised, and the team&#8217;s willingness to accept short-term gross-margin dilution for strategic design wins demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of carrier procurement cycles. AmpliTech&#8217;s management is well positioned to convert early ORAN leadership into multi-year, high-margin revenue.<br /><br />My biggest issue with management is their IR has not been great. They had not scheduled an earnings call for Q4 results and released the results, and the stock sold off 30% after the results. Then, in what seemed kind of reactionary, they scheduled a call to discuss the results. They also do not do a very good job at getting back to investors who have questions. This is not an idea killer to me if the business decisions seem correct and they are focusing on execution, but I do think they could improve IR.<br /><br />Substantial long term growth prospects<br /><br />AmpliTech sits at the epicenter of the secular shift to Open RAN in 5G infrastructure. Traditional 4G RAN was monolithic and proprietary, locking operators into single-vendor ecosystems with high costs and limited flexibility. ORAN disaggregates the radio, baseband, and software layers, enabling multi-vendor interoperability, which is why Amplitech has succeeded in selling into much larger MNO telecom companies. ORAN is an interesting product within 5G that is more flexible and adoptable than its 4G counterpart.<br /><br />Specifically, AmpliTech&#8217;s 5G ORAN product offers ~30% cost savings, faster innovation, and domestic supply chain security, which is a critical sales advantage over Chinese competition due to geopolitical concerns.<br /><br />As I mentioned above, the key investment insight about the 5G opportunity ahead of AmpliTech is understanding the 5G infrastructure rollout versus the previous 4G infrastructure. A key differentiator is the dramatically higher density of endpoints required for 5G versus 4G. 5G demands gigabit-per-second speeds, ultra-low latency, and higher bandwidths. These requirements force denser network topologies as higher-frequency bands, which have shorter propagation distances. The shorter distances of propagation force telecom companies to deploy many more small cells and massive MIMO radios per square kilometer (5-20x depending on the buildings and structures nearby). This density is required for applications that require low latency and fast two-way signal strength, like autonomous vehicles, AR/VR, drones, and other new technologies.<br /><br />Industry forecasts project the global 5G infrastructure market growing at a 22%+ CAGR by 2035. ORAN will be a major subset of that growth. AmpliTech&#8217;s U.S.-made, OTIC-tested, O-RAN-compliant, and interoperability-proven device positions the company as a rare domestic pure-play beneficiary.<br /><br />Current analyst consensus (one covering firm) forecasts align with management&#8217;s reaffirmed FY2026 revenue guidance of at least $50 million (roughly 2x FY2025), which to me is an easy forecast to hit with just the existing two LOIs. But the company recently discussed that they are in the process of RFPs and other discussions for additional LOIs on their 5G ORAN products. I expect we&#8217;ll hear more about further LOIs by mid-summer, which could materially bolster the 2025 revenue and support another sizable revenue growth in 2026.<br /><br />The Legacy RF and Spectrum divisions should continue growing mid-teens, providing a stable base while 5G systems become the dominant, higher-margin contributor. Gross margins normalize to ~40%+ by H2 2026 and sustain or expand thereafter, driving robust free-cash-flow generation and potential for margin expansion through operating leverage.<br /><br />Reasonable valuation<br /><br />AmpliTech reported what was viewed by investors as a bad quarter in Q4 2025. Although revenue grows 111% y-o-y, it sequentially declined for the last two quarters. On top of that, the gross margins went down to 24%. Management did a fairly good job at explaining the Q4 numbers, although the conference call was a week after the earnings announcement.<br /><br />The 2026 revenue guidance of &#8220;at least $50m&#8221; in revenue is still intact, and management confirmed that on the call. There will likely be some lumpy quarters as they ship orders against both of their LOIs. Investors never like a lumpy business, so I suspect that is why its current enterprise value is just $46m.<br /><br />Below is my base case forecast for the company based on the existing 5g ORAN LOIs and the other business lines.<br /><br />Note that the company completed a rights offering in January 2026, in which they sold 2.2m shares at $4 which came with two rights: Series A right with $5 strike and expiry in July 2026, Series B right with $6 strike and expiry in November 2026. This would be about a 18% share dilution if the rights were executed, which suggests some resistance around $5-6/share. What is interesting about this rights offering is, why did management execute this with such short expiry times? $5 in July 2026 and then $6 in November 2026. It is a bit of foreshadowing from management, about what they see on the horizon for 2026.<br /><br />There is a bull case where they receive new LOIs for 5G ORAN, as management has suggested on the recent call. If that is the case, their revenue growth might be significantly higher than 30% in 2027 and 2028.<br /><br />The only analyst covering AmpliTech (Maxim Group) revised down their price target from $9 to $7 a share after the Q4 2025 earnings report on margin concerns. Currently Maxim Group is forecasting 2026 EBITDA at $11m, which would put the valuation at 3.5x 2026 EBITDA. I am a bit suspicious of that figure, as I think it assumes full-year gross profit at 40%, instead of a blended full-year number closer to 35%. Even so, my 2026 EV/EBITDA multiple is just 10.3x, and then it drops to 4.4 for 2027. This is more than reasonable if the company can continue its path to EBITDA and cash flow breakeven while growing the topline at +30%. I believe shares are worth north of $6 (210% upside) once the company can prove out gross margins and scale their 5G ORAN business.<br /><br />Catalysts and Conclusion<br /><br />&#8226; 5G ORAN LOIs: With over $100m in LOIs in hand, the main issue will be timing around projects and rollouts. Management expects to get through a good chunk of the LOIs in 2025, so I assume we will see a few quarters above $10m revenue.<br /><br />&#8226; New LOIs for 5G ORAN: The 5G rollout globally is still in the expansion stages globally, where cost might become a key factor in new projects, which is exactly where AmpliTech is strongest.<br /><br />The worst seems to be behind AmpliTech in terms of the valuation drop after the recent earnings. Q1 has historically not been a great quarter for the business, but they expect to begin to start executing against the LOIs they have in hand, so I would expect to see a solid Q1 report, which will put investors at ease with the story.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=AMPG+US&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on AmpliTech Group</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>AppLovin Corporation $APP US by Bristlemoon Capital</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis: </strong>AppLovin Corporation is a highly profitable mobile ads platform expanding into e-commerce with compelling unit economics and AI-enabled advantages, offering attractive upside from growth and a mispriced multiple.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MxKLm-eSLIkCkZMT_drLf1knSVXp1Mtg/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis: </strong>AppLovin (APP), the largest position in the Fund, declined by almost -41% in the March quarter. This drawdown in the stock was a material hit to the Fund&#8217;s performance for the quarter. Like many of the Fund&#8217;s other holdings, expectations for future earnings for APP have steadily increased, yet the share price plummeted due to misplaced AI-disruption fears. In other words, all of the APP stock price decline was driven by a decline in the earnings multiple. Some of the APP stock price movements during the quarter are worth recounting to highlight the bizarre trading activity we observed. For example, APP declined by -30% in January 2026. This included a -17% single-day selloff following Google&#8217;s announcement of Project Genie &#8211; a generative-AI tool enabling users to create 3D playable worlds via text prompts. This price decline appeared irrational to us, given that this development is more likely to be positive for APP. In a world where AI reduces the barriers to game content creation, we would likely see an explosion of new mobile games. And in a world flooded with games, content becomes commoditised, and distribution &#8211; that is, getting your game in front of people who want to play it and spend money &#8211; becomes the scarce asset. This plays into AppLovin&#8217;s strengths. The company allows mobile game publishers to monetise their games via ads, historically by showing in-game ads for other mobile games (although more recently this has expanded to e-commerce ads). The more games that are created, the more in-game ad inventory which AppLovin can monetise and earn revenue from. More likely than not, an initiative like Project Genie would be a boon for AppLovin&#8217;s business, yet the market ruthlessly sold off the stock. This gives some context as to the market environment we have been operating in. In the same month, AppLovin also came under perhaps the most frivolous short seller attack yet, this time allegedly linking the company&#8217;s largest non-insider individual shareholder to all manner of Chinese money laundering and Cambodian &#8220;pig butchering&#8221; scams. We spent 30 minutes on Google and realised the short seller had mistaken the identity of this shareholder (Mr. Tang Hao) &#8211; the central figure of the entire short report &#8211; with an entirely unrelated third party. We would note that at its recent all-time high in late December 2025, AppLovin&#8217;s stock had more than 10x&#8217;d in price since our initial purchase in August 2024. We would also point out that this is a stock that fell by 57% in a less than two month period earlier in 2025. In other words, AppLovin is an unusually volatile stock. Despite this, we have chosen to hold AppLovin as a material position in the Fund because we understand the business well and are of the view that the future growth opportunity is very significant, and, crucially, the market is mispricing this growth potential. We remain very constructive on APP&#8217;s future earnings growth potential for a number of reasons: The core mobile game ads business continues to grow very strongly. For example, in Q4 of 2025, with AppLovin&#8217;s e-commerce revenues still in their infancy, the business still managed to grow revenues by 66% year-over-year. This was primarily driven by continued algorithm improvements in AppLovin&#8217;s core mobile gaming business. Moreover, AppLovin grew its adjusted EBITDA by 82% year-over-year in Q4 of 2025. The company had 84% adjusted EBITDA margins, with incremental margins of more than 95% in the quarter. In other words, AppLovin is phenomenally profitable and growth is being attained at incredible margins. This is an important point as it relates to the company&#8217;s nascent e-commerce initiative. AppLovin has been rolling out its e-commerce initiative in various phases. Firstly, it was a pilot limited to 600 advertisers, that later expanded into a referral program. The company is rolling out its self-service product to advertisers in 1H26. AppLovin has been measured with the rollout of this initiative, spending the time to build out various functions and integrations to ensure that greenlighting the initiative for General Availability will go smoothly. The crux of the self-service platform is that it automates the onboarding of advertisers so that smaller merchants can launch ad campaigns without needing hands-on support from AppLovin&#8217;s team. This means that the growth of advertisers on AppLovin&#8217;s platform could be explosive. They can bond their credit card to the portal and start spending in short order. This opens up a veritable wall of spend that we believe will find its way to AppLovin&#8217;s platform, given positive early return on ad spend (ROAS) feedback we&#8217;ve heard from advertisers and the desire for a credible third platform for scaled user acquisition spend outside of Google and Meta. The economics of this e-commerce initiative are unusually compelling for AppLovin. The company pools together ad dollars and purchases ad impressions on a CPM basis (we explain APP&#8217;s business model in more detail in our September 2024 quarterly letter). APP CEO Adam Foroughi disclosed at the Morgan Stanley TMT Conference in March 2026 that the company had a 1.3% conversion rate (CVR) on the ads served by AppLovin. This means that AppLovin loses money on 98.7% of the ads they serve; in other words, APP purchased that ad impression but there was not a monetisation event against the impression from which they could earn revenue. This is an incredibly bullish data point for a number of reasons: &#8226; APP can serve e-commerce ads against the ad impressions that are likely to be wasted on gaming ads. Given that AppLovin has already paid for these ad impressions, the effective take rate on these impressions for an e-commerce ad that converts is 100%. &#8226; The introduction of e-commerce ads will lead to a greater diversity of ads on AppLovin&#8217;s platform, producing additional signal to improve the company&#8217;s ad targeting algorithms. Foroughi has spoken about eventually getting to a 5% CVR, up from the current 1.3%. &#8226; Such an increase in the CVR could drive a multiple-times increase in AppLovin&#8217;s revenue without any increase in advertiser ad spend (stylised example below). Of course, higher CVR should also deliver improved return on ad spend (ROAS), prompting advertisers to spend more with AppLovin. And given the wonderful economics of AppLovin&#8217;s platform, these revenues would come in at close to 100% incremental margins. Finally, AppLovin&#8217;s self-service rollout is coinciding with the exponential improvement in video generation models. Historically, mobile game studios have had dedicated teams churning out highly interactive, long-form, unskippable video ads and playable end cards. E-commerce merchants and direct-to-consumer brands usually don&#8217;t have those resources; they are accustomed to putting standard image or short video assets onto platforms like Meta or TikTok where watch time is less than five seconds. Simply porting over these ads is suboptimal. AppLovin&#8217;s video-based ad network operates in a full attention environment: the average watch time of ads on the platform is an unskippable 30 seconds, with 81% of ads served being longer than 30 seconds. AppLovin is rolling out automated video ad generation, significantly easing the burden of ad creation for e-commerce brands, which should have two key impacts: 1) it should improve AppLovin&#8217;s top-of-funnel efficiency with converting brands to active advertisers, given that only 57% of qualified leads currently convert to active campaigns (with the biggest cause of lead breakage due to those brands not having video ads); and 2) it is likely to dramatically increase the velocity of spend on the platform, precipitating an explosion in ad dollars flowing through AppLovin&#8217;s platform. We were able to add to the Fund&#8217;s AppLovin position at sub-$400, a level which we believe represents compelling value. At these levels the business is being valued at 25x forward GAAP EPS, despite sellside expecting earnings to more than double from 2025 to 2027. In talking to a number of investors, it seems that they are put off by the complexity of AppLovin&#8217;s business. However, to the extent that APP&#8217;s robust growth continues, it becomes harder for investors to ignore this stock.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=APP+US&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on AppLovin Corporation</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited $300750 CH by Munro Climate Change Leaders Fund</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis: </strong>Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited is the global leader in EV/ESS batteries with scale, innovation, and pricing pass-throughs supporting multi-year profitable growth.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qTvVfVGQfsJFuMvP_Qxlba2l9eG12KlE/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis: </strong>CATL, in the Clean Transport Sub-Area of Interest, is the world&#8217;s largest battery cell manufacturer with 39% of global market share in power batteries in 2025. The company operates a vertically integrated model spanning mining, processing, R&amp;D and battery cell production for electric vehicles (EVs) and energy storage systems (ESS). In EVs, which remains the largest end market for their products, the company&#8217;s customers include 9 of the top 10 leading EV manufacturers by volume. CATL holds a leading position in lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, which are increasingly the preferred chemistry due to their cost advantage and superior safety profile. While we anticipate EV volumes to slow in 2026, larger batteries with longer range mean a content uplift opportunity for CATL. However, recently it has been ESS, not EVs, which have the more exciting area of growth. In particular, China needs ESS because much of the solar it has already installed is curtailed (essentially wasted) because supply exceeds demand. To illustrate, in the first half of 2025, 33% of the solar generated in the western Chinese region of Tibet was curtailed. If they had more ESS, they could store this excess supply during daylight hours and use it in the evening peak. To address this, China recently announced ambitious ESS policies aiming to grow capacity by nearly 30% p.a. to 180GW by 2027, requiring investment of US$35b: a huge revenue opportunity for developers and battery makers. We anticipate growth of over 50% in CATL&#8217;s ESS end market in 2026. At CATL&#8217;s result in late March, they also confirmed expectations of between 20-30% volume growth for the next 5 years. CATL also said they expect net profit per unit (kWh) will remain stable in 2026. The ability to grow profitably has been a key difference between CATL and listed peers which, despite also benefiting from the underlying volume growth, have struggled with maintaining margins. This was a key focus leading up to the result given the lithium price, a key raw material for batteries, has increased over 30% year to date (using the Chinese lithium carbonate spot price as a proxy). CATL reiterated that its EV customers have cost pass through contracts, and for ESS they regularly adjust prices for raw materials and demonstrate value-add to maintain pricing and margins. We also continue to see CATL leading innovation. One example is in sodium ion batteries. In February, CATL and EV maker Changan Automotive unveiled the first mass-production EV with sodium ion batteries - a technology which does not use lithium and promises between 30-40% lower battery cost versus lithium over time. It also changes the percentage of the battery cost which comes from raw materials, with CATL hoping that they can again benefit from their technological lead and grow profitably. Finally, in the Market Outlook above we discuss the implications of the Iran war on the energy transition, and how electric vehicles may benefit. The chart below shows Google Search interest over time in the phrase &#8220;electric vehicle&#8221; is at all-time highs. In the US, current interest eclipses both the introduction of Biden-era $7,500 consumer subsidies in 2022 and the spike in interest ahead of them being scrapped in 2025. Again, while the many macro implications of the Iran war &#8211; including interest rates and consumer confidence &#8211; are unknown, it does suggest a rapid change in preferences.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=300750+CH&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>CTS Eventim AG &amp; Co. KGaA $EVD GY by Acatis</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis: </strong>CTS Eventim is a dominant European ticketing platform with pricing power, strong long-term profitability, and a durable moat from exclusive contracts.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DzIXdcgVL-_3VhwohDK35YOegCANE_JU/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis: </strong>CTS Eventim: We are investing in CTS Eventim, the market&#8217;s leading provider for ticketing solutions, as growing demand for live events (e.g. Olympic Games and world championships) and the company&#8217;s long-standing power to set prices will enable an attractive return on equity and good entry opportunities as part of the software sell-off (see also interview on page 7). CTS Eventim was one such purchase. Over a period of 25 years (and disregarding the downturn during COVID-19), the company&#8217;s profits have reliably increased at a rate of 23-25 percent. The return on equity was always around 30 percent, and the return on investment at 22 percent. This led to similarly impressive valuations with P/E ratios of 30 to 35. Consequently, when the P/E ratio falls below 20, we see an opportunity. All the better. The ticket system &#8211; the company&#8217;s prime product &#8211; is basically software. But it is accompanied by a wide moat (contracts with event organizers and artists), so that the company enjoys a monopoly-like market position in large parts of Europe. There is no legal basis to do so. They can take action during takeovers, but not in the case of organically grown monopolies. There is no basic right to attend a concert, and therefore no political interest. We might be talking about putting the brakes on rents, but not one is talking about putting the brakes on ticket prices.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=EVD+GY&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on CTS Eventim AG &amp; Co. KGaA</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Edwards Lifesciences Corp $EW US by Artisan Global Opportunities Strategy</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis:<br /><br /></strong>Edwards Lifesciences is a heart valve leader with reaccelerating aortic and fast-growing tricuspid franchises supported by strong data and margin expansion potential.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wdLYRbCEXZVgqc6LXeoRdPwYoOsff_ga/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis:<br /><br /></strong>Edwards Lifesciences designs, develops, manufactures and markets products and services for the treatment of late-stage cardiovascular disease. The company is a long-standing leader in heart valve replacement, particularly minimally invasive, catheter-based solutions. We initiated a position as the core aortic valve franchise reaccelerates and demand for newer tricuspid valve therapies is growing rapidly, expanding Edwards&#8217; addressable market. This next product cycle is supported by strong clinical data and increasing physician adoption, with Edwards gaining share as competing solutions struggle to match its outcomes. Over time, potential for workflow simplification, including greater procedural autonomy for cardiologists, could improve capacity and utilization, supporting both volume growth and margin expansion. Following several years of elevated investment, we expect stronger revenue growth to drive margin expansion.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=EW+US&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on Edwards Lifesciences Corp</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Eurobank SA $EUROB GA by Ariel Global</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis: </strong>Eurobank SA is positioned to benefit from Greece&#8217;s recovery with multi-year loan growth, wealth management focus, regional acquisitions, solid capital, and competitive ROE.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sMukOoWD33ugRnCMUS2UMkujTXkU_8Dk/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis: </strong>We bought Greece-based financial services and asset management company, Eurobank SA because we believe it is poised to significantly benefit from Greece&#8217;s economic recovery. Eurobank should have the opportunity to expand its loan book over the next 5-7 years supported by sustained credit growth and macroeconomic tailwinds. Its focus on wealth management and recent acquisitions in Cyprus and Bulgaria strengthen our conviction. Meanwhile, we expect the country&#8217;s absorption of European funds and private credit penetration to present further upside for shares. From our perspective, the company&#8217;s diversified approach, sturdy capital position and competitive return on equity underscores our confidence in its long-term value.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=EUROB+GA&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on Eurobank SA.</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Hangzhou First Applied Material $603806 CH by Guinness China A Share</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis: </strong>Hangzhou First Applied Material is the leading solar encapsulation film maker benefiting from pricing power and potential market share gains as input cost pressures drive industry consolidation.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Kv7u8E3OhjNLsZBasGrItcKRU14NkdP7/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis: </strong>Hangzhou First Applied Material is the world&#8217;s largest manufacturer of solar encapsulation film, which is used to protect solar modules. Its primary raw material is a derivative of oil and gas, and developments in the Middle East have led to a significant increase in input costs. In the short term, First Applied is benefiting from its leading market share, allowing it to raise prices. In addition, the company is selling inventory produced at lower historical costs into a higher price environment, providing a temporary increase to margins. But with inventory days of c.54, this benefit is likely to be short-lived. As inventories are replenished at higher spot prices, the margin uplift is expected to normalise. Looking beyond the next month or two, higher input costs have historically been associated with higher solar film prices, suggesting that the company may be able to pass on higher costs to customers. At the same time, smaller competitors who already under pressure from industry oversupply and weak profitability may struggle to do the same. This could accelerate industry rationalisation and provide First Applied with an opportunity to further consolidate market share.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=603806+CH&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on Hangzhou First Applied Material</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Harbor Diversified $HRBR US by Cedar Creek Partners</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis: </strong>Harbor Diversified is a cash-rich holding after selling Air Wisconsin, trading well below estimated net cash with catalysts from strategic alternatives.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1O4cvRwUW7zRaRRUJ-B-5VmCLc3Z1MSC6/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis: </strong>Harbor Diversified is a recent addition to the fund. While we have followed the story for a few years and occasionally owned a small amount of shares, we decided to purchase shares after their December 18, 2025, announcement of the company selling its Air Wisconsin subsidiary and all related aircraft in three separate deals for aggregate consideration of $113 million. They are delinquent in their SEC filings but are in the process of catching up. As of December 31, 2024, we know they had $112 million in cash and securities, which we do not think was part of the assets sold at the end of 2025.<br /><br />What we don&#8217;t know is how much money Harbor lost in 2025 prior to the asset sale. We are estimating Harbor lost $60 million in 2025, with $25 million of the loss being due to depreciation, resulting in a cash loss of $35 million. If roughly correct, that would leave Harbor with around $180 million in cash and securities after paying transaction costs and taxes. Shares outstanding as of March 11, 2026, were 58.4 million. That would equate to $3.08 per share versus the current $1.50 per share price. At that gap, we don&#8217;t have to be precisely right, just approximately.<br /><br />Harbor&#8217;s 10-K for 2024 was filed on April 8, 2026. The filing included a notation stating:<br /><br />We are currently in the process of evaluating potential strategic alternatives, which may include investments in, or acquisitions of, one or more businesses, assets, technologies, joint ventures, or other strategic opportunities. Any such transactions could involve one or multiple investments or acquisitions, be in any number of industries or lines of business (which may or may not include the airline industry), and involve the use of cash, equity securities, or a combination thereof. In addition, we may pursue other strategic alternatives, which could include, without limitation, the issuance of one or more cash dividends, share repurchases, tender offers, registering as an investment company, a liquidation, or other potential transactions.<br /><br />Based on the language in the 10-K, we expect Harbor to either acquire a business at a fairly attractive price or return capital to shareholders.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=HRBR+US&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on Harbor Diversified.</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. $HE US by Horizon Kinetics</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis:<br /><br /></strong>Hawaiian Electric Industries is a regulated utility in post-disaster recovery with predictable earnings normalization and eventual dividend reinstatement, offering high yield on cost and low risk of permanent loss.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QAeAUjKNwtvYsWspMJYJiTXmwE_BwJie/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis:<br /><br /></strong>Hawaiian Electric Industries, also a familiar holding in our portfolios, is an example of opportunistic income investing but that is not obvious, since the company doesn&#8217;t pay a dividend. It won&#8217;t show up in a yield-sorted database or income fund. That&#8217;s only because it is still early in its recovery phase from the Maui fire disaster of 2023 and the monetary liability it has to pay, so the company has yet to reinstate the dividend. But its recovery&#8212;the future credit upgrades and earnings&#8212;is even more predictable (certainly directionally, if not precisely) than Cheniere&#8217;s was, because Hawaiian Electric is a regulated utility. Its ultimate dividend yield&#8212;on our cost&#8212;will be well into the double digits. It only requires patience.<br /><br />We believe Hawaiian Electric will be a superb investment. If it&#8217;s established as a large core position, it won&#8217;t be because of how high it might go, but because of how low the risk of permanent capital loss is in a recovery-stage regulated utility. Yet, because it can be a large position, its portfolio impact will also be large, even if it&#8217;s not a &#8220;moonshot.&#8221; The &#8220;but&#8221; is that after the company achieves its financial goals several years from now, it will just be an ordinary utility company with state regulated growth and returns on equity. At that point, the return profile will be largely a function of interest rates as opposed to operational achievements.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=HE+US&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.</a></strong></p><div><hr /></div><h3><strong>Hemnet Group AB $HEM SS by Bristlemoon Capital</strong></h3><p><strong>Thesis: </strong>Hemnet Group AB is a Swedish property listings platform with near-term headwinds but improving volumes from its SFPL rollout that support a recovery and rerating from historically depressed multiples.</p><p><strong>Source</strong>: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MxKLm-eSLIkCkZMT_drLf1knSVXp1Mtg/view?usp=drivesdk</p><p><strong>Analysis: </strong>The most extreme case of multiple compression in the portfolio has been Hemnet. Unlike many of the Fund&#8217;s other holdings which have experienced stable to increasing earnings estimates, Hemnet&#8217;s multiple deterioration has been accompanied by a reduction in consensus earnings estimates (in this sense, the decline in the earnings multiple afforded to Hemnet has not been totally unfair). We underestimated the cyclicality of the housing market as well as rising competitive pressures. This has resulted in a particularly severe decline in Hemnet&#8217;s stock price, making Hemnet the largest detractor from the Fund&#8217;s returns since inception. Hemnet, in our view, remains a quality business with a bright future ahead. The narrative, however, has been muddied by a very weak Swedish property market, competition concerns, and fears of AI disintermediation. We believe that these concerns are overblown and our view is that they should begin to fade once listings volumes start growing again. However, this deteriorating narrative has reduced the earnings multiple that investors are willing to pay for Hemnet, with the P/E multiple declining from north of 50x at the beginning of 2025, to just 18x today. In other words, in a little over a year, there was a -64% decline in the share price just from the multiple alone. Furthermore, Hemnet&#8217;s multiple is almost two standard deviations lower than its average P/E multiple of 50x since the business went public in 2021, which statistically speaking is a very low probability event. When layering on the decline in earnings estimates, Hemnet stock has declined by around -75% since the February 2025 share price peak. The stock had always traded at a rich multiple, and we felt that this was an acceptable price of admission to gain access to our view at the time of a strong earnings growth trajectory. In hindsight, we paid too high of a price for Hemnet in light of the downturn in the Swedish housing market, which has changed agent behaviour in a way that has fed increasing listings supply to Booli, Hemnet&#8217;s competitor. The price we paid left no margin of safety for a deterioration in near-term earnings expectations for the business. Over a longer time frame, we believe that Hemnet will return to growth and this episode will be but a bump in the road. But in the short-term we have suffered a significant drawdown in the Fund&#8217;s Hemnet position that has materially weighed on the overall returns of the portfolio. Importantly, our mistake was not necessarily in purchasing Hemnet on the basis of our assessment of the long-term earnings power of the business. It was in anchoring too heavily to this long-term view, while not being nimble enough with adjusting our position size as investor confidence deteriorated and as the market became less willing to look out at those future earnings. We have channelled these reflections into the position sizing framework we discuss later in this letter. We are thankfully starting to see some green shoots with Hemnet, stemming from the Sell First Pay Later (SFPL) payment option rollout, as well as the LVR rule changes that came into effect April 1, 2026. As a reminder, Hemnet is in the process of rolling out a new payment option where property sellers can list their home on Hemnet at no upfront cost, and will only pay Hemnet in the event that their property sells. We believe this removes the largest friction to sellers listing on Hemnet &#8211; that is, the upfront outlay without a guarantee that the property will sell &#8211; and our thesis was that this would lead to a significant improvement in listings volumes over time. This is already beginning to occur. For example, in the first week of February 2026 in Stockholm where the SFPL model was introduced, Stockholm listings were down -5% year-over-year compared to listings being down -22% year-over-year for Hemnet as a whole. Hemnet&#8217;s share of listings in Stockholm jumped from 78% on an LTM basis to 95% in the first week of February. And we have observed further improvements in listing volumes, with the number of published homes on Hemnet declining by -1.8% year-over-year in the first week of April 2026, compared to a -40% year-over-year decline in the preceding week. Listing volumes in the first week of April surged by an incredible 67% week-over-week. We believe that if Hemnet can show a continued improvement in the listings volume trajectory, then investors will begin to rebuild confidence in the stock and the multiple should rerate. From these incredibly beaten down levels, we are projecting a more than 40% IRR from the Fund&#8217;s Hemnet investment over the next three years.</p><p><strong><a href="https://www.hfbestideas.com/?q=HEM+SS&amp;page=1">Access our full research database on Hemnet Group AB</a></strong></p>
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