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Commercial Real Estate (Offic Focus) Analysis

Analysis of Commercial Real Estate Markets
(Working Draft)

Originated: 02/01/25 10:27 am CST

Last edit: 02/18/25 3:14 pm CST

 

Authors note: I've been holding on to this for a couple months; after getting exactly 0 job interview (and being correct on the first hypothesis), I wanted to share with y'all in hopes that you may profit.

 

Primary Hypothesis (moderate-strong confidence):

The commercial real estate market is potentially entering a more turbulent period.

Despite the strong economic recovery since 2020, the commercial real estate space has continued to struggle, particularly office space.

As monetary conditions remain relatively tight, it is possible that mortgages written on properties in a low-interest rate environment may struggle to be refinanced; this may be exacerbated by workflow trends, increased vacancies, and stagnating fundamentals

Secondary Hypothesis (moderate-weak confidence):

The insurance industry largely prefers to reinvest premiums in fixed-income and interest bearing assets.
As we have transitioned from a low-rate environment to a high one, I anticipate that any risks associated with low-yield instruments held on balance sheets have been properly hedged by now.[\[1\]](#_ftn1)

However, with an increased cost of replacement materials due to elevated inflation/wages and increasing prevalence of natural disasters, I believe that underlying market fundamentals may have shifted; the underwriting process is becoming more challenging. In the pursuit of greater returns (and based on personal/quantitative analysis), I believe this industry may be seeking out returns in a manner that is sub-optimal.

 

Tertiary Hypothesis (weak confidence):

As banks have shied away from lending, private credit, private equity and non-banks have stepped in to fill the gap in lending. This tends to be less regulated, and may be implicated in the above referenced.

\*I will probably ignore the last hypothesis for now.

**Initial Data:**

[Figure 1](https://preview.redd.it/zya7ce5shcsf1.png?width=539&format=png&auto=webp&s=520736582f5944d516723cdf9c4fe3fe1b2106b2)

[Figure 2](https://preview.redd.it/uc3ilg2vhcsf1.png?width=540&format=png&auto=webp&s=401b3c794e24b3727feb095a4d00f30d27022011)


Fred Data:

Figure 1 shows the total amount of commercial real estate (CRE) loans held by all commercial banks through Q4 2024.[\[2\]](#_ftn2)  Figure 2 shows the annual change of CRE loans through Q4 2024.[\[3\]](#_ftn3)

Comparing the two, the percentage annual change became positive in Q4 of 2012, experienced (at least two) local peaks in Q1 2015 and Q3 2022, and has been below single digits in the last two quarters (2024 Q3: 0.3%, Q4: 0.6%).

A critical component of loan origination is the Federal Funds Rate.

 Below, a table that includes the total value of these underlying loans, 3 months pre/post the calendar month in which the Federal Reserve changed the direction of interest rates:

 

 


 

||
||
|Date|Amount ($B) or rate shift|Change ($B)|% Change|
| 9/1/2015|1734.044| | |
|12/17/2015|rate increase|97.746|5.636881|
|3/1/2016|1831.790| | |
|5/1/2019|2230.241| | |
|8/1/2019|rate decrease|63.294|2.837989|
|11/1/2019|2293.535| | |
|12/1/2019|2320.046| | |
|3/3/2020|rate decrease|64.232|2.768566|
|6/1/2020|2384.278| | |
|12/1/2021|2531.718| | |
|3/17/2022|rate increase|129.685|5.122411|
|6/1/2022|2661.403| | |
|6/1/2024|2998.333| | |
|9/18/2024|rate decrease|8.457|0.282057|
|12/1/2024|3006.790| | |

 

This would seem counter-intuitive: when interest rates rise, the magnitude of change over a +/- 3 month period is greater than the magnitude of change when interest rates fall.[\[4\]](#_ftn4)

There are at least two (or more) likely explanations for this:

1.      In an economic environment where rate increases are warranted, lending activity is elevated. When interest rate decreases are warranted, lending activity is depressed.

2.      When interest rate increases are expected, origination's are increased in anticipation. When interest rate decreases are expected, originations are delayed in anticipation.

I have also analyzed this 1 month pre/post (not included): a similar pattern exists and may be included in further versions.

Market depth:

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis[\[5\]](#_ftn5), the Commercial Real Estate Market was valued at $22.5 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2023. Back then, banks and thrifts held the majority of the $5.9 trillion debt (50%), followed by Government-sponsored enterprises(17%), insurance companies and securitized debt (approximately 12% each).

According to Statista, the total in 2025 is expected to be $25.79 trillion.[\[6\]](#_ftn6)

According to Janus Henderson, the Commercial Mortgage Backed Security market is worth approximately $1.7 trillion as of Q4 2024.

https://preview.redd.it/56lykeo0icsf1.png?width=607&format=png&auto=webp&s=0c4bf1c5fe061270bacbd55522fb4e338c48984a

**Background (CRE/Office emphasis):**

The data suggests that the United States remains in a period of economic expansion. Through Dec. 2024, the benchmark indices have gained more than 50% in two years.

However, recent GDP growth has slowed in the most recent quarter (2.3% Q4 2024 vs. 3.1% Q3 2024).[\[7\]](#_ftn7)

The author of this document is restraining this document to a specific segment of the macroeconomic picture: commercial real estate.

For example, a recent article from Commercial Real Estate news states that there was 5.8 million sqft of negative absorption in the most recent quarter, with 57 million sqft for FY 2024. National vacancy for office space sits at 20.9 percent, up from last years 19.4 percent.[\[8\]](#_ftn8)


49 out of 93 office markets recorded negative absorption in the latest quarter.[\[9](#_ftn9)


The entire space has approx. 5.46 billion sqft of space. Average asking rent was $38.20/sf, up from $37.67/sf a year earlier, representing 1.4% increase in rent overall.

(Author’s note: I intend to add more to this)

Data:

**Graph #1: CMBS Issuance Data (**generated from csv file; Source :Trepps)

 

https://preview.redd.it/1p0c4wk7icsf1.png?width=641&format=png&auto=webp&s=73b84d0922fb35ab1430986dd5d9a4d11ec31ade

This is a time series of CMBS issuance data, in $T(Q2 2024-Q1 2010). In a vacuum, when analyzing risk assets, one would assume an exponential slope. I am not certain that applies here.


A notable inflection in the data occurs between the Q3 and Q4  2019 data points ($1,595.9 Billion to $1,634.4 B, a sequential change of \~$38 B). The following points a less steep increase, starting in 202

The slope of the graph starts to accelerate for the Q2 – 2021 data point (as the economy began re-opening), and began to flatten again in Q1 – 2022. The Federal Reserve beginning to hike interest rates in March of 2022.

(simplified) context: origination tends to slow in rising/elevated interest rate environments, and the term of loans for commercial real estate properties generally have a duration of 5-10 years.

The Federal Reserve began cutting interest rates in September of 2024, and they have fallen a full percentage point; however, inflation remains persistent, and the current signaling is no further cuts until June of 2025. Below, the head and tail of a CMBS (Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities) table.

**Graph 2 CRE Delinquency (**same source**):**

 

https://preview.redd.it/b8l7n2ncicsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=c2b1b2f9d1ffb52ffb22d5af20649d9890acf401

The above two graphs represent delinquent loan count by type and a delinquency time series, respectively. without having a dataset to work on but briefly (Jan. 25):

‘Office’: 10.03% (only two time points have surpassed this: July 2012 and December 2024)

‘Retail’: 6.72%

‘Lodging’: 5.76%

‘Multifamily’: 1.55%

‘Industrial’: 0.44%

**Additional Individual Analysis:**

This is an extension of a series I wrote between December 2022 and March 2023. While lacking precision, I was correct in predicting the conditions that led to the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank.

I am taking a more measured approach now, but the following are personal observations that I have made as a resident of Dallas, Texas.

I started noticing many “For Lease/For Sale” signs, in addition to ones that were there before I lef

**Image 1: Driven Route**


https://preview.redd.it/zp442gygicsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=814abe3ea12c822d1840b35b8c5f02a7bfb4e1cf

This is an image of an approximate 3.5 mile route I drove. Residential zones are in gray, while yellow zones are commercial properties.[\[10\]](#_ftn10)

In total, I counted 17 different signs advertising space for rent.

One of the signs that stood out most prominently for me was Engvest. I went to their website, where they advertise “over 1 million sqft of property under management”.[\[11\]](#_ftn11)

Going through the total listings I manually collected a dataset (n=96 with at least one redundant entry). the listed spaces were for entire buildings, not units; large amount of rent/sale prices were listed as “negotiable”.


Here’s a few included as a reference:


||
||
|Address|Square Feet|Cost (generally per SF)|Cost (Purchase)|Notes|
|14355 Torrey Chase Blvd | Houston, TX 77014|2900||269900||
|2152 W NW Hwy Ste 122 | Dallas, TX 75220|2515|negotiable|||
|5876 E Berry St. | Fort Worth, TX 76119|12500|7000.00/month(total)||Industrial (note: says $7500 in ad)|
|5611 S Custer Rd. | McKinney, TX 75070|34300|negotiable||Note: digitally rendered photos|
|3811 S Cooper St Ste 2404, Arlington, Tx 76015|714||75000|Actual restaurant|
|10595-10669 HWY 49 | Brookland, AR 72417|546678||435,000.00|Land|
|1818 E Overton Road | Dallas, TX 75216|1800||200000||
|123 Executive Way | Desoto, TX 75115|10800||Call for pricing||
|1600 N. Plano Rd. | Richardson, TX 75082|48487|Negotiable|||
|315 North Greenville Avenue | Richardson, TX 75081|25743.96|negotiable|negotiable||


Of note is 3876 E. Berry St., that has a listed price of $500 less per month than what was written in the body of the text, a property that only appeared to be digitally rendered, and an actual, running restaurant (it was BBQ but I forget the brand).

\*Note: I seem to remember the data being different when inputting, so a similar pattern may have occurred elsewhere

 

**Skyscrapers:**

After gathering these data points, I was looking to find a firm in order to investigate further.

I found a company listed as the Texas Hedge Fund Association listed at 1700 Pacific Ave, Dallas, TX, 75201. I went in, talked to security and went to the listed suite #4100; completely vacant.

I went back to the security desk at the front and asked for directions to the 14^(th) floor; that floor was vacant as well (see below).

 

In total, out of the 49 floors in this skyscraper, 20+ were vacant. Below, a snapshot of that property from LoopNet[\[12\]](#_ftn12):

https://preview.redd.it/hv3xgnojicsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=de8d4535c545616172601bea0a27c33938612aa4

4 stars and A class building. I suspect the A class rating was obtained through renovations, so would anticipate that it gets relegated to “B” in 2026.

**Texas Real Estate Investment Association Pitch:**

I decided to attend an employment/investment pitch held in Dallas, TX. The final two hours being devoted to commercial real estate; the analysis of the speaker was that we were going from a “hot” residential market to a “lukewarm” one. Commercial real estate was were the “big money” was to be made.

Return on investment was projected to be 100% over a five year period, with a standard LTV said to be 70% and a typical rent increase of 10% year.

 At the end, the presenter was asked by the author about office space:

“We don’t invest in any office space, a lot of those properties are selling for $.40 to $.50 on the dollar”.

The author was then talking to a broker seated nearby. Through the conversation, the broker shared that they work as a lender with various insurance companies; with customer premiums (and the lack of payouts through claims), investments were being made in commercial real estate properties. These were largely non-securitized, so they did not have to reference the SOFR benchmark.

 

**Demographic Change and Building Forecasts:**

For this portion of analysis, I am planning to compare demographic changes for metropolitan areas and CRE vacancy/construction (in progress).

Selected entries from a quarterly report from Lee & Associates (Q4 2023 to Q4 2024, Head/Tail):

https://preview.redd.it/s9mel60oicsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=73f47aaaaadc1bd87a26f3ebf36306872bf3189f

https://preview.redd.it/wds3s4cpicsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=89827a405bbc7f50b5ad63e6c17ef5fdb28585f1

https://preview.redd.it/7tfj3znqicsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=acc150a397b56f0e7172a73a7224eb061a8ad1f3

https://preview.redd.it/8wq81ffticsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=ba24ea86c507ae1840cb1bfc62bfe277c9ecef59


Briefly, on average, cap rate went up, U.S. vacancy rate went up, sale price went down, SF under construction went down, inventory went up.
**More skyscrapers:**

https://preview.redd.it/k7qr1lgvicsf1.png?width=839&format=png&auto=webp&s=00449b2e2ceaeb762d4c34550a8de8fe9fc094ac


The green building, from conversations with employees, had an occupancy rate of 70%. The blue building had no permanent tenants (save potentially a café), as it was being converted to apartments.

Below, one of the yellow properties:

https://preview.redd.it/ijzluxfxicsf1.png?width=975&format=png&auto=webp&s=4270a522e6e9ea2c17b07a15e8fdfe785cc10b9d

 

Using the smaller of the two estimates: 176,xxx/592,xxx= 70.3% occupancy at best.

**Where does this show up on financial statements?**

A good place to look is on balance sheets of banks that now hold real estate due to foreclosure. Loan origination and loans held for sale are also starting points, but imperfect. If this were to be of material impact, I would expect this to appear (after the fact) in credit profiles. Pre-arranged revolving credit agreements may be a fruitful starting point as well if worst case scenarios are assumed.

**Is this temporary? Are we at the end of a cycle?**

My inclination is no, and that the real impacts well be felt in the coming quarters.

**How can one potentially profit from this?**
There are multiple ways. My starting point is trying to find regional banks most exposed, non-bank lenders that may be extending loans on properties where the fundamental and market values are different, and (hopefully) analyzing CMBS tranches in more detail to understand if the property loans that underly them are actually as sound as stated.

 

.

[\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Board of Govenors of the Federal Reserve System (US) via FRED, “[Real Estate Loans: Commercial Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks (CREACBM027NBOG) | FRED | St. Louis Fed](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CREACBM027NBOG)”

[\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Board of Govenors of the Federal Reserve System (US) via FRED, “[Real Estate Loans: Commercial Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks (CREACBQ158SBOG) | FRED | St. Louis Fed](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CREACBQ158SBOG)”

[\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This is a extremely reductive analysis, and does not account for the behavior or rationale of individual actors in an economy.

[\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Federal Reserve of St. Louis, “[Commercial Real Estate in Focus | St. Louis Fed](https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2024/may/commercial-real-estate-in-focus#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Federal%20Reserve's,and%20real%20estate%20investment%20trusts.)”

[\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Statista, [Commercial Real Estate - US | Statista Market Forecast](https://www.statista.com/outlook/fmo/real-estate/commercial-real-estate/united-states)

[\[7\]](#_ftnref7) “Gross Domestic Product, 4^(th) Quarter and Year 2024 (Advance Estimate)”, *Bureau of Economic Analysis*, [Gross Domestic Product, 4th Quarter and Year 2024 (Advance Estimate) | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)](https://www.bea.gov/news/2025/gross-domestic-product-4th-quarter-and-year-2024-advance-estimate)

[\[8\]](#_ftnref8) “National Office Market Records Negative Absorption for 12th Straight Quarter”, *Commercial Real Estate News,* [*National Office Market Records Negative Absorption for 12th Straight Quarter – Commercial Real Estate Direct*](https://crenews.com/2025/01/23/national-office-market-records-negative-absorption-for-12th-straight-quarter/)

[\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Chicago was the worst at 2.14 million sqft; 21.6% (2023) to 25.1% vacancy. Dallas  had 915,887 sf negative absorption, with vacancy rates rising to 26.2 percent form 22.9 percent.

[\[10\]](#_ftnref10) In more granular detail, a larger amount of the roadside property is commercial, but this is for illustrative purposes.

[\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Personally held dataset.

[\[12\]](#_ftnref12) LoopNet, [1700 Pacific Ave, Dallas, TX 75201 - 1700 Pacific | LoopNet\[if !mso\]>](https://www.loopnet.com/Listing/1700-Pacific-Ave-Dallas-TX/26939004/)

09/30/25 Brief update (screenshots):

Now that we are probably close to "max pain", an update.

https://preview.redd.it/ajsbfqgqjcsf1.png?width=1609&format=png&auto=webp&s=4bad9c3c0541f46d86e1c38066e197fe57e29b7a

Plus a screenshot of some relevant article headlines. Still bitter.

https://preview.redd.it/mpie7205kcsf1.png?width=519&format=png&auto=webp&s=9c26e7f5d7bbd9a49463a0f0625bae0cc0fe5566

Finally, a screenshot of relevant equities from today, 09/30/25.

https://preview.redd.it/rwmt3gtskcsf1.png?width=960&format=png&auto=webp&s=b286e3de366b25d16f4f0dba0c64c66fd2d67f28

Still salty I couldn't profit off of those garbage CMBS tranches, but I wasn't expecting much.