Posts
D-ASP (Darkstar ARX Substitution Permutation) - ML-KEM-1024 Anchored SPNA 16 Cascade Engine
As the cryptographic landscape shifts towards post-quantum readiness, I realized that relying on a single language or a monolithic architecture wasn't enough. I needed sovereign, high-throughput security that could seamlessly bridge every layer of a modern tech stack. So, I built D-ASP. D-ASP is a defense-grade, post-quantum encryption engine anchored …
ci-sha4096: a hash function whose constants are derived from atomic emission spectra and a rational constant with an exact 18-bit binary period
I've built a 4096-bit hash function called ci-sha4096 with an unusual property — every round constant is independently verifiable from first principles, derived from two orthogonal sources: 1. K-constants from Ci = 85/27, a rational constant whose fractional part repeats every exactly 18 bits in binary (mult. order of 2 …
Schnorr's Interactive Protocol - Tutorial
[https://github.com/LamprosM-prog/schnorr-interactive-protocol-csharp](https://github.com/LamprosM-prog/schnorr-interactive-protocol-csharp) Hi first post here, this is a "tutorial" of of schnorr's interactive ZKP protocol. Using a Trace all mathematical equations are showcased in the a console. Any feedback is welcome !
Is lattice cryptography actually quantum resistant, or just not yet understood?
Been digging into post quantum cryptography lately and why lattice based crypto feels convincing. I've noticed most people talk about quantum threats from a Grover perspective: “Quantum computers just search faster” “Security gets roughly cut in half” “Increase key sizes and you’re mostly fine” It makes intuitive sense to me …
OSCW 2026 - Graeme Connell - Forward Secrecy for Signal Secure Backups
Feisty Duck Cryptography & Security Newsletter 137 (May 2026)
Building Private Processing for AI tools on WhatsApp
Open Source Cryptography Workshop 2026 in Taipei - Photos & Videos
Breaking the Illusion of Key Zeroization: How OS, Libraries, and Hardware Keep Your AES Keys Alive
Terminating/padding each absorbed chunk in Keccak/SHA3.
I'm deriving the session keys using Keccak/SHA3 by absorbing three(3) things: (1) the salt, (2) the common secret and (3) bits from a common key file. Normally, all three are concatenated and then padded, and the whole thing is absorbed. Would it still be secure if I pad each one? …