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Post-quantum security of HMACs
NIST claims that the security of HMACs is given by `MIN(key_len, 2 * out_len)` which means that HMACs with`out_len == key_len` provide a security strength equal to the length of the key. Considering NIST classifies a key-search attack on AES-256 …
Post-quantum PAKE
I'm currently working on integrating a post-quantum password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol into my application. To ensure I make an informed choice, I'm looking for a comprehensive survey or overview of existing post-quantum PAKEs. Does anyone know of any resources, …
Asymmetric Data Encryption - Is reversing the role of keys interesting or valuable?
I'm currently testing a new encryption algorithm that reverses the traditional concepts of asymmetric keys (like RSA/ECC). For context, current asymmetric algorithms (RSA/ECC) are primarily used for symmetric key exchange or digital signatures. Like this: * Public key: Encrypt-only, cannot …
What should the server do in a TLS 1.3 handshake if it doesn't recognise the early data PSK?
I have a 0-RTT handshake as follows: Client's perspective: First flight: The client pings off client hello, then uses the early keys to encrypt early data and end of early data application record. The encrypted records are all 'wrapped' and …