Intuit's stock price has fallen 66% year-on-year. Opportunity, or not?
Even before getting into nerdy financial analysis:
* Intuit trades at a trailing **P/E** of **16.1x**, despite growing revenue by **14% year-over-year** during the first nine months of fiscal 2026. I liked what I was looking at.
So I spent a week looking at their 10-Ks, 10-Qs and building a full DCF from the ground up.
**Current price:** $266
**My Base Case:** $669/share (60% margin of safety)
**My Best Case:** $866/share (69% margin of safety) (nice)
I also stress-tested the biggest fear I could think of, where **TurboTax (26% of revenue) disappears completely after two years** due to AI/IRS disruption in my Base Case. I still got an intrinsic value of **$548/share**, implying a **51% margin of safety**.
Main Takeaways I found:
* **QuickBooks** remains the core economic and cash printing engine, making up **59% of total revenue**. It grew **16% in FY2025** and **17% for the first nine months of FY2026**, with no evidence of structural deterioration.
* Management regularly attributes growth to **pricing power, customer growth and product mix**, not acquisitions alone.
* Despite all the AI fears, **TurboTax still grew \~7.5% year-over-year** in the first nine months of FY2026. Intuit appears to be navigating the market quite well.
* Debt is conservative (Debt/FCF ≈ **1.27x**).
* Buyback authorisation about roughly **13.5%** of market cap. Even after accounting for stock-based compensation, buybacks at today's price look value-creating for us shareholders.
Red Flags:
* Intuit **moved** a whole bunch of **product expenses** to **'Other Corporate Expenses'**. Removing these expenses **doubled operating margins**. Although they r**estated previous years**, I'd be careful calculating segment and product margins, as they seem artificially boosted, and lack some expenses that I think economically belong under their product segment.
* I got around this in my DCF by independently forecasting 'Other Corporate Expenses' in my valuation model.
**Market fears** appear to reflect **short-term problems**. Worries about 17% workforce cut. Broader tech-selloffs. Although growth did slow, analysis shows it may represent **normalisation** after unusually strong previous years and a string of acquisitions in the past. Furthermore, the current market price seems priced in far below any realistic growth stagnation scenario.
The market seems to be pricing Intuit as though its core business is entering **permanent decline**. But I found **no evidence** of that.
**My personal take:** SMEs will **always** need **accounting and tax software**. Intuit is the **market leader**. Intuit looks to be an exceptional business with conservative leverage that an idiot could run, although the **moat** of some of its products is **slowly degrading.** But the market has over-reacted as usual and presented a real deep-value opportunity.
At **current stabilised growth levels**, Intuit will keep **hitting record profits** and **generating record FCF**. In the long-term, Wall Street will have to take notice, turning this short-term loser into an long-term winner.
Full Report: [https://philipneumann.substack.com/p/intuit-intu-deep-value-research-report](https://philipneumann.substack.com/p/intuit-intu-deep-value-research-report)
